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2Abstract
The four case studies on chance in evolution provide a rich source for further philosophical
analysis.  Among the issues raised are the following: are there different conceptions of chance at
work, or is there a common underlying conception?  How can a given concept of chance be
distinguished from other chance concepts and from non-chance concepts?  How can the
occurrence of a given chance process be distinguished empirically from non-chance processes or
other chance processes?  What roles does chance play in evolutionary theory?  I argue that in
order to answer these questions, a careful distinction between process and outcome must be
made; however, the purpose of this essay is not to answer these questions definitively, but rather
to elaborate on them and to provide a starting point for further discussion.
31. Introduction.
It is an honor and a pleasure to comment on the work of four such distinguished philosophers of
biology as these.  Although these works stand on their own, it will be worthwhile to remind the
reader of the main themes.  Each essay focuses on a different area where chance plays a role in
evolution.
John Beatty’s “Chance Variation: Darwin on Orchids (Especially Twisted Orchids)” elucidates
Darwin’s concept of chance variation in orchids, the resulting divergent evolution of otherwise
similar populations, and the role that chance variation plays in Darwin’s case for evolution by
natural selection. Robert Richardson’s “Chance and the Patterns of Drift: A Natural Experiment”
analyzes the studies of human blood types by Luigi Cavalli-Sforza et al. and argues that they are
evidence that chance, in the form of genetic drift, is explanatorily autonomous and independent
of debates over (in)determinism.  Robert Skipper’s “Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics: Drift vs.
Draft” explicates the concept of genetic draft, distinguishes it from genetic drift, and discusses
John Gillespie’s argument that genetic draft is a more important evolutionary cause than genetic
drift because it reduces heterozygosity at a faster rate.  Finally, Michael Dietrich’s “Three
Perspectives on Neutrality and Drift in Molecular Evolution” explores neutral molecular
evolution as: 1) a simple and useful mathematical model in its early formulations; 2) a testable
theory within population genetics; and 3) an explanation of the “molecular clock” in
biochemistry.
In considering these case studies of chance in evolution, it seems to me that four issues or themes
of particular philosophical interest arise.  (In some cases, these are themes that the authors
themselves emphasized; in other cases, these are themes that I have extrapolated from the
authors’ discussions).  First, can the conceptions of chance illuminated by the case studies be
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different areas of evolutionary theory?  Second, as one reads through the case studies, it becomes
apparent that it is often necessary to distinguish a particular concept of chance from a “non-
chancy” concept or from another “chancy” concept.  Third, and relatedly, biologists often seek to
empirically distinguish the occurrence of a given chance process from non-chance processes or
other chance processes.  And fourth, the case studies show that chance plays many different
kinds of roles in evolutionary theory.  I cannot hope to provide definitive analyses of each of
these issues here; thus, my goal is the much more modest one of illuminating these common
themes and raising questions concerning each.
2. Interlude: A Lens of Process vs. Outcome.
Before beginning my analysis, it will be helpful to be clear on the distinction between “process”
and “outcome,” particularly as it occurs in evolutionary situations.1 By “process” I mean a series
of physical states occurring over time, whereas by “outcome” I mean the effect, or ending state at
a particular point in time, of that process.  To see why this distinction is important, suppose that
there were a population of conspecific organisms in which there is a genetic locus where two
alleles (A and a) are of equal numbers.  In other words, suppose that the frequency of A,
represented by the variable p, is 0.5, and that the frequency of a, represented by the variable q, is
1-p.  Let us further suppose that the three genotypes formed by the two alleles (AA, Aa, and aa)
are equal in fitness, and that the population is small and that environmental conditions keep the
population small over time.  In each generation, the following process (an indiscriminate
sampling process) occurs: a large number of gametes are produced, from which only a random
subset (the “sample”) are successfully united to form zygotes.  (The subset is “random” in the
sense that A gametes have an equal chance of being united to form gametes as a gametes do).
Because the random sample is small (by the assumption of a small population), the proportions
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generation.  In other words, the outcome – the frequency of A and a alleles – may show an
increase from the previous generation.  Or, it might show a decrease, or it might stay the same.
As this sampling process is repeated in each generation, a series of outcomes is produced, and
because these outcomes can represent increases or decreases from the previous generation, we
would expect the gene frequencies of the population to fluctuate over time.  Figure 1 gives an
example of gene frequency changes for A over the course of generations (a plot of the successive
outcomes) that would be consistent with this sampling process.
[ put Figure 1 about here ]
The problem is that the pattern shown in Figure 1 – the same fluctuation of gene frequencies
over time – can be produced by a very different process, namely, a discriminate sampling
process.  Consider a population where the genotypes differ in fitness, but where the environment
is fluctuating over time.  To see how such a population could produce the same pattern, suppose
that at the outset, the aa genotype is fitter than AA and Aa genotypes.2 Thus, we would expect
that there would be a decrease in the frequency of the A allele, which is what the figure shows.
However, after a few generations the environment changes so that now aa is less fit than the
other genotypes.  We would then expect an increase in the A allele, which again, is what the
figure shows.  Each increase or decrease in the frequency of A shown by the figure could
similarly be explained by a change in the environment that produces a change in the relative
fitnesses of the genotypes.
In other words, the same outcomes (the same pattern of gene frequency changes over
generations) can be produced by two different processes, namely, 1) an indiscriminate sampling
process (Beatty 1984) where physical differences between organisms are causally irrelevant to
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physical differences between organisms are causally relevant to differences in reproductive
success.  Thus, if we want to understand the biological situation, we cannot just consider
outcomes; we must also take into account the processes that produce those outcomes.  Elsewhere
(Millstein 2002, 2005) I argue that we should call the first process “random drift” and the second
“natural selection,” and that the terms “random drift” and “natural selection” ought to reflect
process rather than outcome.  Here I want to make a lesser point: it is often useful in trying to
understand concepts and empirical debates in evolutionary biology if one is careful to distinguish
between process and outcome, as the following discussion will show.
3. One Unified Conception of Chance in Evolution or Many?
Each of the case studies invokes a putatively different conception of chance that can be described
in terms of a chance process and a probable outcome.  (For each of these chance processes, other
outcomes are possible).  In Beatty’s analysis of Darwin’s concept of “chance variation,” or
perhaps more accurately, “chance differences in variation,” the chance process is that different
variations arise at different times in similar populations in similar environments, which can
produce an outcome where you have different adaptive strategies among initially similar
populations, yielding an immense number of variations on a “theme.”  (Philosophers of biology
are familiar with “chance variation” in the sense that new variations are not an adaptive response
to the environment; based on Beatty’s discussion, it would seem that this sense does not fully
capture the meaning of “chance variation” for Darwin.  It should be noted, however, that
Beatty’s focus is more on the evolutionary implications of “chance variation” than it is on the
meaning of “chance variation”). The chance process discussed by Richardson is what biologists
call “random genetic drift” or often just “drift.”  Richardson characterizes this chance process as
the “error” in the transmission of types from generation to generation arising from finite
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populations than among large populations.  Skipper explores the chance process of “genetic
draft,” which is a process of linked selection where it is a matter of chance which of two neutral
alleles (in a two-locus model) happens to be linked to a site that undergoes an advantageous
mutation, and where the timing of these mutations, followed by a rapid selective "sweep" to
fixation, is random.  As Skipper discusses, one of the interesting properties of genetic draft is
that it can produce an outcome similar to that which one would expect from genetic drift in small
populations, namely, a reduction in genetic variation (thus the similar name). Dietrich’s focus is
on “neutral evolution,” which, after selection quickly eliminates the many deleterious mutants
and fixes the few advantageous mutants, invokes the chance process of drift – but at the
molecular level.  The expected outcome of the neutral model of molecular evolution is that most
molecular variation is neutral or “nearly neutral.”
Prima facie, these are different conceptions of chance – they apply to different aspects of the
evolutionary process (e.g., production of new variation vs. perpetuation of existing variation) or
to different levels of organization (phenotypic vs. molecular) or different time scales
(microevolutionary vs. macroevolutionary).  So then the question arises as to whether there is a
common conception of chance underlying all of them.  This is a difficult question, and I will not
be able to fully address it in the space allotted here, but I will try to shed a little light on it.
The complexity of the question becomes obvious when one realizes that “chance” itself has more
than one meaning.  Elsewhere, drawing on Eble 1999, I argue that there are six conceptions of
chance that are potentially relevant to evolutionary theory: 1) chance as “uncaused” or
“fundamentally random,” implying a denial of Laplacean determinism, and, perhaps a
vindication of the realist interpretation of quantum mechanics; 2) chance as “not by design”; 3)
chance as ignorance of the real underlying causes; 4) chance as “indiscriminate sampling”
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items are picked) ; 5) chance as “coincidence” (an idea associated with Aristotle, implying the
confluence of independent causal chains); and 6) a distinctly evolutionary conception of chance,
or chance as “independent of the generally adaptive direction of natural selection.” (Millstein
2000a).  I think it is fair to say that each case study involves chance in at least one, and probably
more than one, of these senses.  However, a complete analysis would require exploring each of
the four case studies in light of each of the six notions of chance, a probably tedious and
certainly lengthy prospect.  Thus, I will limit myself to discussing the first conception because it
is the most easily ruled out.
With regard to the first conception, Richardson suggests that the nature of chance that drift
embodies is independent of philosophical debates over indeterminism and determinism (see, e.g.,
the debate between Brandon and Carson 1996 and Graves, Horan, and Rosenberg 1999; but see
Millstein 2000b for a critique of both).  The relevant conception of indeterminism here is the
ontological (and not the epistemological) one; i.e., determinism is the view that given the
complete state of the world at a particular point in time, for any given future point in time, only
one state is possible, whereas indeterminism is the view that given the complete state of the
world at a particular point in time, more than one future state is possible.  And Richardson’s
claim that this is not what is at stake for drift seems right.  (This also means that Dietrich’s case
study, to the extent that it also incorporates drift, similarly does not turn on the determinism
question).  There are differences in blood group frequencies among the villages; these
differences in frequency may be due entirely due to deterministic factors that lead one person to
marry another, or they may be partially the result of fundamentally indeterministic factors.  That
is, it may be the case that given the identical set of circumstances (identical villages, people,
etc.), the same results would have occurred, or it may be the case that different results would
have occurred. Either of these possibilities is consistent with the phenomenon of drift and its
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description than factors such as marriage choices, which means that questions concerning those
underlying causes become irrelevant.  Deterministic drift and indeterministic drift would both be
drift.  Thus, whatever conception of chance drift invokes, it is not the first conception described
above.4
Similar arguments can be made for Skipper’s case study and Beatty’s case study.  Actually, the
two case studies, dealing with conceptions of chance developed in different centuries, share an
interesting commonality; both examine phenomena where the timing of new variations is said to
be the result of chance, and in both cases, this can lead to different trajectories for different
populations.  Now, there is good reason to believe that point mutations, at least, are
fundamentally indeterministic (Stamos 2001), so one might be tempted think that Skipper’s and
Beatty’s case studies involve indeterministic chance.  However, one should resist that
temptation.  One could imagine a universe in which it is the case that it is a completely
deterministic process as to when and where a given mutation occurs.  That is, one can imagine
that it was always the case that given the identical circumstances, the same mutations would
have occurred in the same place and time – and yet the concepts of chance would remain the
same.  As with the drift case, I think that consideration of the level of description is important;
the chance phenomena under discussion are independent of the lower-level causes that produce
mutation.
So, with regard to the first conception of chance that I outlined, my conclusion is negative; my
claim is that none of the four case studies relies on chance in that sense.   However,  I leave open
the possibility that one or more of the other five conceptions apply; further analysis is needed.
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4. Conceptually Distinguishing Chance from Non-Chance And Chance from Chance in
Evolutionary Theory.
Another theme that arises from these case studies is the extent to which it becomes necessary to
distinguish these concepts of chance from other biological concepts – usually to distinguish
chance from non-chance, but sometimes to distinguish one kind of chance from another kind of
chance.
Recent work in this area has focused on distinguishing the concepts of selection from drift (e.g.,
Beatty 1984; Brandon 1995; Millstein 2002, 2005; Shanahan 1992)5 and on distinguishing
“deterministic” from stochastic models of macroevolution (Millstein 2000a).  The case studies
highlight the fact that these analyses have just begun to scratch the surface; there are more
conceptual distinctions to be clarified within evolutionary biology with respect to chance.  For
example, Beatty shows how Darwin’s concept of chance variation contrasts with “teleological”
and “unity of plan” approaches (both of which assume a Creator).  Skipper’s paper, on the other
hand, distinguishes drift from draft (chance from chance!) and shows that the conceptual
distinction cannot be found in the mathematical models of their outcomes (which are identical),
but in the processes themselves.
These issues deserve further exploration, and their existence implies that there may be other
conceptual debates over chance that ought to be explored philosophically.
5. Empirically Distinguishing Chance from Non-Chance And Chance from Chance in
Evolutionary Processes.
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Evolutionary biologists spend quite a bit of time attempting to determine whether, for a given
population or in general, whether chance processes are operating or non-chance processes are
operating.  More precisely, as Beatty (1997) has argued, evolutionary biologists engage in
“relative significance” debates.  That is, they argue over the extent to which the changes in a
given population or populations are due to chance processes.
The case studies illuminate a number of these relative significance debates.  In some cases,
biologists seek to empirically distinguish chance from non-chance.  Richardson’s paper discusses
how to distinguish selection from drift in an ensemble of populations by looking to see whether
the actual patterns match the expected patterns.  Dietrich explores the difficulties in determining
the relative significance of neutralist and selectionist assumptions, even as both sides
acknowledge the phenomena of neutrality, drift, and selection.  In other cases, biologists are
trying to empirically distinguish chance from chance.  Skipper’s paper discusses Gillespie’s
argument that draft is less sensitive to population size than drift, which leads Gillespie to claim
that draft is a more significant cause of evolution than drift.  Skipper also points to other relative
significance debates over chance in evolution: drift and draft as compared to mutation, boundary
and origination processes, and selection in a random environment.  Beatty points to recent work
on the relative significance of chance variation and drift.
As with the previous section, these issues deserve further exploration, and they point to the
possibility that there may be other empirical debates over chance that ought to be explored
philosophically.
6. Roles for Chance in Evolution.
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Taken as a whole, the papers in this session suggest four possible roles for chance in evolution:
an explanatory role, an instrumental role, a representational (“realist”) role, and a justificatory
role.  I will discuss each of these in turn.
First, there is an explanatory role for chance.  That is, we frequently seek concepts of chance that
can explain phenomena in nature.  Richardson argues that drift can explain certain general
patterns of changes – in the case he discussed, a pattern of greater differentiation among small
populations than among large populations.  Dietrich identifies explaining the “molecular clock”
as one goal of the neutralist camp.  Furthermore, I infer from Beatty that Darwin sought to
explain different adaptations among orchids, and I infer from Skipper that Gillespie seeks to
explain why molecular variation is largely insensitive to population size.
Second, there is an instrumental role for chance.  That is, sometimes we seek concepts of chance
that are useful to us in some way, without necessarily believing that they reflect reality.  This is
seen most clearly in Dietrich’s paper, which describes the early use of neutral models as starting
points for investigations of drift, selection, and migration, even though investigators believed the
models to be unrealistic.
Third, there is a representational, or “realist” role for chance.  Often, we are seeking concepts of
chance that represent phenomena in nature.  Each of the proponents of the chance concepts
discussed in the four case studies sought to describe phenomena in nature (with the exception of
the early use of neutral models noted previously).
Fourth, there is a justificatory role.  Sometimes, we seek concepts of chance that aid in the
justification of other, less chancy phenomena.  Beatty argues that Darwin’s concept of chance
variation helped bolster Darwin’s case for evolution by natural selection. Dietrich mentions that
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Kimura and Ohta claimed that the neutral theory provided evolutionary theory with a testable
model.
Thus, there is no one role for chance in evolution, but many – and there may be additional roles
for chance that need to be explored.
7. Summary/Conclusion.
The four case studies evoke the following conclusions.  There is no one concept of chance, but
many – and yet there may be an underlying unity.  These concepts of chance will need to be
distinguished from one another, not just from non-chance, both conceptually and empirically.
The process/outcome distinction can help here.  There is no one role for chance, but many.
Furthermore, there are more concepts and debates for philosophers and historians of biology to
seek out.  In sum, there’s more to the study of chance in evolution than what has been discussed
previously – determinism vs. indeterminism and drift vs. selection – although I would not say
that these debates are entirely resolved, either.
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Figure 1. The changes in frequency, p, of an allele A in a population of conspecific organisms
over time.  These successive outcomes can be produced by an indiscriminate sampling process or
by a discriminate sampling process in a changing environment.
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1 This is, of course, a very common distinction, occurring in numerous non-evolutionary
contexts, where it is usually couched in terms of “process” and “product.”  Here I avoid the term
“product” because of its teleological connotations.
2 I am assuming that A is dominant to a and that AA and Aa have the same phenotype.
3 This is somewhat different from my own characterization of drift, described above, but the
differences are not important here.
4 In Millstein 2000a, I argue that drift involves chance in the fourth, fifth, and sixth senses; it is
also fair to say that it involves chance in the second sense.
5 On my view, this is a project of distinguishing “less chancy” selection from “more chancy”
drift, whereas on some other accounts selection is a chance process only when it is conjoined
with drift.
